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Reward, Punishment, and Interdependence

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  • Richard Rosecrance

    (Center for International Studies Cornell University)

Abstract

This essay seeks to show that the successful use of reward and punishment is related to the degree of interdependence among the parties. Where the relationship is one of "independence," A cannot influence B using either technique. Where the relationship is one of "interdependence," rewards and punishments can be easily given, and they are likely to be of influence. On the other hand, once given it will not be easy to withdraw "rewards." Thus no unilateral influence process is established. Where the relationship is one of "dependence" of B on A, both "rewards" and "punishments" are influential. The analytical conclusions of the essay are used to help explain why World War II could not have been prevented using "rewards" and why World War I (under different circumstances of sensitivity to opponent interests) might have been obviated or postponed by the judicious use of "reward."

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Rosecrance, 1981. "Reward, Punishment, and Interdependence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(1), pages 31-46, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:25:y:1981:i:1:p:31-46
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278102500102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harold H. Kelley, 1965. "Experimental studies of threats in interpersonal negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 9(1), pages 79-105, March.
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