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Beyond the Ladder: The Effects of Limited Promotion Opportunities on Bureaucrats’ Career Decisions and Work Effort

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  • Taeho Kim

Abstract

Public-sector organizations often struggle to provide sufficient promotion incentives, raising concerns that limited advancement opportunities may undermine worker morale and performance. This study examines how frontline bureaucrats’ effort levels and career decisions respond to restricted promotion opportunities. In the Chicago Police Department, strict eligibility criteria for promotion exams unexpectedly reduced promotion chances for some officers compared to otherwise similar officers. This reduction in managerial promotion opportunities led ineligible officers to significantly increase their effort levels, as measured by arrest performance. The increase in arrests cannot be attributed to selective quitting, problematic behavior, or efforts motivated by overtime pay or future promotion. Instead, these officers pursued roles in high-performance tactical teams, which offer prestige and are viewed as a meaningful horizontal alternative to managerial advancement. Together, these results suggest that bureaucrats facing limited promotion opportunities may seek alternative ways to advance their careers and enhance their efforts, highlighting the importance of offering diverse career development options within public-sector organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Taeho Kim, 2025. "Beyond the Ladder: The Effects of Limited Promotion Opportunities on Bureaucrats’ Career Decisions and Work Effort," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 78(2), pages 355-380, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:78:y:2025:i:2:p:355-380
    DOI: 10.1177/00197939241304379
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