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Positive Theory of Planning: The Social Choice Approach

Author

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  • Tore Sager

    (Department of Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 7491 Trondheim, Norway)

Abstract

Most planning theory is normative and does not aim at explaining the design of planning processes. However, once the relationships between organisational characteristics and the various modes of planning are established, these connections can be used for developing positive planning theory. The problem is to explain why an agency practises a particular mode of planning (synoptic, incremental, etc), or even why it performs a specific variant of such a mode. It is argued that the impossibility theorems of social choice provide a useful platform for attacking such problems. In order to explain the practice of planning agencies, a scheme for linking agency properties and planning modes is combined with alternative strategies for resolving dilemmas of agency decision-making. A brief survey of other theoretical approaches to the construction of positive planning theory opens the discussion and places the social choice analysis in a theoretical context.

Suggested Citation

  • Tore Sager, 2001. "Positive Theory of Planning: The Social Choice Approach," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 33(4), pages 629-647, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:33:y:2001:i:4:p:629-647
    DOI: 10.1068/a3319
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle, 1986. "The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 135-178, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tikkanen, Jukka, 2018. "Participatory turn - and down-turn - in Finland's regional forest programme process," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 87-97.
    2. Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde & Miguel A. García-Rubio, 2017. "Public Participation in European Water Management: from Theory to Practice," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(8), pages 2479-2495, June.
    3. Sara González & Patsy Healey, 2005. "A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to the Study of Innovation in Governance Capacity," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(11), pages 2055-2069, October.

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