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Gender and participation in decision-making in labor-managed firms: The context of the USA

Author

Listed:
  • Genna R Miller

    (Duke University, Durham, NC, USA, gm19@duke.edu)

Abstract

Workers’ participation in making business decisions is a key aspect of the management structure of labor-managed firms. However, studies of the variables that determine the degree to which an individual participates in decision-making fail to consider the impact of gender relations. This paper first argues that the organizational features of labor-managed firms have a significant impact on participation. Second, the paper argues that that these organizational features and other explanatory variables have different effects on women’s and men’s participation, due to patriarchal gender relations. Third, this paper tests these theories using data from American labor-managed firms. Several of the variables and organizational features have significantly different impacts on women’s and men’s participation. Notably, occupational status, the surplus distribution method, the wage differential, performance measurements, and the level of cross-training each have gender-differentiated effects on participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Genna R Miller, 2011. "Gender and participation in decision-making in labor-managed firms: The context of the USA," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 32(1), pages 87-113, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:32:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113
    DOI: 10.1177/0143831X10376420
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amartya K. Sen, 1966. "Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 33(4), pages 361-371.
    2. Cherlyn Skromme Granrose & Arthur Hochner, 1985. "Are Women Interested in Saving Their Jobs Through Employee-Ownership?," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 6(3), pages 299-324, August.
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