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Does regulation fail or do we fail regulation?

Author

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  • Janice A. Beecher

    (Michigan State University, USA)

Abstract

Regulation has always been “political†to some degree, born of politics and subject to political forces, both good and bad. The more intractable question might be whether regulation as we know it is sustainable, given signs of institutional weakness. In this context, regulators need to either sustain their institution or concede to alternative institutional forms and conceptions of the public interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Janice A. Beecher, 2019. "Does regulation fail or do we fail regulation?," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(3), pages 258-269, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:crnind:v:20:y:2019:i:3:p:258-269
    DOI: 10.1177/1783591719865988
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas J. Howe, 2019. "Governance models of public utility commissions in the United States," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(3), pages 229-239, September.
    2. J.A. Beecher, 2012. "NARUC as Network: A Perspective on the U.S. Regulatory Policy Community," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 13(4), pages 362-389, December.
    3. Steve Thomas, 2019. "Is the ideal of independent regulation appropriate? Evidence from the United Kingdom," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(3), pages 218-228, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hellwig, Michael & Polk, Andreas, 2021. "Do political links influence water prices? Determinants of water prices in Germany," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

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