Fiscal Equalisation: Some Questions of Design
The case for fiscal equalisation can arise because of differences between states' average incomes or populations. In this paper, we examine the latter in a simple case, using different formulations of the social welfare function: Benthamite; Rawlsian; and Nash. We distinguish, in the process, two different understandings of efficiency abroad in economics — a Paretian notion, that is irrelevant to the case in hand; and a quasi-utilitarian sense. We conclude that fiscal equalisation is required only in the Rawlsian case. In all other cases, private goods consumption should be equalised — but no fiscal equalisation is required.
Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (July-August)
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