Il potere di voto nel sistema parlamentare italiano in regime proporzionale e la dinamica della spesa pubblica dal 1960 al 1990
We study the Granger causality between the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power and Italian public expenditures from 1960 to 1990. The received wisdom that public expenditures' growth is determined by a cross-action of "all" the political groups elected by proportional electoral systems is not empirically verified for Italy. We show that only the most relevant (in terms of power) political groups cause the expenditures' growth. Moreover, the statistically significant causal relation from public expenditure to political powers suggests that the existing expenditures, once originated, were (amongst the) determinants for maintaining and strengthening the political power.
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Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (March-April)
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