A strategy to convert quotas to tariffs is to auction the quota rights and use the realized auction prices as guides to setting tariffs. In the 1980s, New Zealand employed auctions to allocate quota licenses. We analyze the relationship between tariff-equivalents and auction prices for auctions with resale. Using panel data from New Zealand's quota license auctions, we estimate the expected value of the tariff equivalent. We exploit data from the secondary market prices to test the model's predictions. The predictions fail, suggesting either that auction prices may understate or that aftermarket prices overstate the true tariff equivalent.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 30 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:158-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.