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Competencia política, empleo burocrático y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un modelo formal

Author

Listed:
  • Gatica, Leonardo A.

    (Universidad de Guadalajara)

  • Soto , Georgina

    (Universidad de Guadalajara)

Abstract

This paper explores how goverment performance, in the sense of efficiency on the provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy, is affected by political competition. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, the main result shows that in any political-economic equilibrium political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods. The article presents a special model of political competition with two parties, where the incumbent provides bureaucratic employment and public goods. The political parties compete to maximize the size of their constituency within the citizenry and since employment can be used as patronage, bureaucratic employment becomes excessive.

Suggested Citation

  • Gatica, Leonardo A. & Soto , Georgina, 2007. "Competencia política, empleo burocrático y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un modelo formal," Revista Nicolaita de Estudios Económicos, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Empresariales, vol. 0(2), pages 97-118.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:rnicee:0036
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    Keywords

    government efficiency; political competition; size of government.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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