The Impact of Corporate Financialization on Investment Efficiency: The Moderating Role of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structure[تأثیر مالی‌شدن شرکت‌ها بر کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری: نقش تعدیلی ویژگی‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌های هیئت‌مدیره و ساختار مالکیتی]

The presence of diverse financial markets and instruments not only expands the options available to managers but also creates opportunities for speculative activities. According to agency theory, managers may prioritize their personal interests over those of shareholders and company owners. The use of financial instruments in non-financial firms can boost short-term profitability but may divert attention from long-term and core business investments. This study examines the impact of corporate financialization on investment efficiency, considering board characteristics and ownership structure. To this end, four hypotheses were developed and tested using a screening sampling method on 163 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2013–2023. The hypotheses were analyzed using multivariate linear regression with panel data, controlling for year and industry effects. The results indicate that corporate financialization negatively affects investment efficiency, while board independence mitigates this negative effect. In contrast, board expertise and the presence of government shareholders did not influence the relationship between financialization and investment efficiency. These findings enrich the literature on corporate financialization and investment efficiency, highlighting that organizational characteristics and governance structures can moderate managerial financial behavior and the optimal allocation of resources. Moreover, the results provide practical insights for managers to make more informed investment decisions and guide policymakers in designing financial market regulations and corporate oversight mechanisms.