IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

A note on hospitals incentives to collude on low quality in a spatial context

Listed author(s):
  • Andree, Kai

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany)

  • Schwan, Mike


    (Faculty of Economics, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany)

This paper analyzes the incentive for a cartel agreement between hospitals. For this purpose we extend a quality competition model developed by Montefiori (2005). We investigate that collusion on a low provided quality level will lead to higher profits for both hospitals. Therefore both hospitals benefit from an agreement. Further we can see if one hospital breaks the cartel rules, while the other stick to the agreement, the defrauding hospital can make additional profits. In addition we study the profits under an infinite time horizon. Under a given specific strategy played by the hospitals, we obtain a particular discount factor under which an agreement still holds.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by European Economics Letters Group in its journal European Economic Letters.

Volume (Year): 2 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 62-65

in new window

Handle: RePEc:ris:eueclt:0016
Contact details of provider: Web page:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:eueclt:0016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mike taylor)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.