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A note on hospitals incentives to collude on low quality in a spatial context


  • Andree, Kai

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany)

  • Schwan, Mike

    () (Faculty of Economics, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany)


This paper analyzes the incentive for a cartel agreement between hospitals. For this purpose we extend a quality competition model developed by Montefiori (2005). We investigate that collusion on a low provided quality level will lead to higher profits for both hospitals. Therefore both hospitals benefit from an agreement. Further we can see if one hospital breaks the cartel rules, while the other stick to the agreement, the defrauding hospital can make additional profits. In addition we study the profits under an infinite time horizon. Under a given specific strategy played by the hospitals, we obtain a particular discount factor under which an agreement still holds.

Suggested Citation

  • Andree, Kai & Schwan, Mike, 2013. "A note on hospitals incentives to collude on low quality in a spatial context," European Economic Letters, European Economics Letters Group, vol. 2(2), pages 62-65.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:eueclt:0016

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    Cited by:

    1. Kai Andree & Mike Schwan, 2016. "Hospital quality, wages and union behavior: a spatial analysis," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 9-17, March.

    More about this item


    Collusion; Quality competition; Duopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations


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