Dumping, antidumping e politica della concorrenza - Dumping, Antidumping and Competition Policy

Recent researches have thoroughly demonstrated that antidumping policy may cause distorsions to competition. The starting mechanism for this possibility can be easily summarised: first, the premise for antidumping intervention is not necessarily an anticompetitive action by the dumper; second, the possibility for the concurrent internal firm to claim for an intervention of its Government against the (real or assumed) dumping of the external firm and the consequent “perspective of protection” aim to modify both firms’ choices in a strategic interaction context. So antidumping causes restrictions to competition, that is an incompatible position with the goal of fair international trade relations which is normally considered its strongest motivation. The paper analyses the reasons for this negative relation and appreciates two alternative solutions: — substituting antidumping policy with an international regulation of competition; — submitting antidumping policy to preliminary investigations about the existence of real distortions to competition and limiting its anticompetitive effects through a greater transparency of procedures and instruments.