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Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Karakaya, Mehmet

    (Izmir Katip Celebi University)

  • Özbilen, Seçkin

    (Ozyegin University)

Abstract

We consider hedonic coalition formation games. A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair which consists of a finite set of agents and a list of agents’ preferences such that each agent has preferences over all coalitions containing her. We study the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights for anonymous and separable hedonic coalition formation games. We prove that for anonymous and separable hedonic games, the existence of a Nash stable partition is always guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Approved Entry or Approved Exit-Free Entry, but the existence of a Nash stable partition is not guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Free Entry. We also analyze the relation of the anonymity and separability with the other sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Karakaya, Mehmet & Özbilen, Seçkin, 2023. "Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights," Business and Economics Research Journal, Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, vol. 14(3), pages 303-319, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:buecrj:0639
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition Formation; Hedonic Games; Nash Stability; Membership Rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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