IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ris/ambsrv/022666.html

Do Political Connections Pay for Pledging of Shares: Evidence from India

Author

Listed:
  • Kousik Ganguly

    (Jindal Global Business School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India)

  • Ajay Kumar Mishra

    (Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kharagpur, West Bengal, India)

  • Bhavik Parikh

    (Saint Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia, Canada)

Abstract

This study examines the stock-pledging behavior of promoters in politically connected Indian firms, using NSE-listed companies from 2009 to 2019. We investigate how capital raised through stock pledging affects investment in high-risk projects and assess the impact of margin call pressure. Results show that higher stock pledging reduces corporate investment; however, promoters with political ties are more inclined to pursue riskier projects. Moreover, politically connected firms exhibit lower stock return volatility, suggesting that political connections help shield these firms from both investment risk and return fluctuations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kousik Ganguly & Ajay Kumar Mishra & Bhavik Parikh, 2026. "Do Political Connections Pay for Pledging of Shares: Evidence from India," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 29(1), pages 235-263, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:ambsrv:022666
    DOI: 10.37625/abr.29.1.235-263
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4022&context=americanbusinessreview
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.37625/abr.29.1.235-263?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:ambsrv:022666. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Amber Montano (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbnhaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.