Business Functions and Conflicting Interests in Agricultural Cooperatives
This work is based on the hypothesis that members of cooperatives share their business privileges with co-heads (Associations, social groups ). In particular it is shown how some cooperation principles and the Italian norms on cooperatives’ profit division generate a principal-co-head problem not foreseen by the principal agent theory models available in literature.Therefore, using a model derived from the principal agent theory of Baumol for enterprises with diffused shareholdings, conflicting interests that arise from the formulation of the cooperatives’ aims and from profit division are discussed.Finally, throughout the analysis of economic accounts of some cooperatives, the existence of conflicting interests between farmers and co-heads foreseen by the theory are verified and the negative effects of this conflict on the members’ entrepreneurship, on the transparency of balance sheets and on self-financing of firms are highlighted.
Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Silvio d'Amico 77, - 00145 Rome Italy|
Phone: +39 06 57114743
Fax: +39 06 57114774
Web page: http://host.uniroma3.it/associazioni/rossidoria/qa.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rar:journl:0139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.