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The Gendered Stereotype of the ?Good Manager? Sex Role Expectations towards Male and Female Managers


  • Markus Gmuer

    () (European Business School, International University Schloß Reichartshausen, Department Management & Leadership)


In the past 30 years, U.S. and international studies have shown that societal expectations of the ?good manager? are closely related to the male stereotype. However, it is not clear, whether this stereotype is the same for men and women alike in managerial positions. The results of a German study with 625 students and 376 professionals participating between 1997 and 2005 are presented in the short note below. The main findings of the study are: 1. Female managers are expected to conform more closely to male stereotypes than are male managers. 2. Higher expectations are set from women and respondents with practical experience than from men and those who are inexperienced. 3. The most recent trend shows that male stereotypes increasingly dominate over female stereotypes. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of highly structured and controlled procedures in order to prevent sex-related discrimination in organizational selection and performance appraisal.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Gmuer, 2006. "The Gendered Stereotype of the ?Good Manager? Sex Role Expectations towards Male and Female Managers," management revue. Socio-economic Studies, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 17(2), pages 104-121.
  • Handle: RePEc:rai:mamere:1861-9908_mrev_2006_02_gmuer

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anne Busch & Elke Holst, 2009. "Glass Ceiling Effect and Earnings: The Gender Pay Gap in Managerial Positions in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 905, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item


    Manager; Selection; Sex Roles; Gender Studies; Germany;

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General


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