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Faut-il inciter l'offre ou la demande de travail peu qualifié?

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  • Pierre Cahuc
  • Etienne Lehmann

Abstract

[eng] Should financial incentives on low skilled jobs favour labour supply or labour demand ? We use dynamical job search matching framework to compare the effects of two policies targeted on low skilled jobs paid at a the minimum wage : reductions of employers' contributions to social security versus reductions of taxes paid by employees such as the « Prime pour l'Emploi ». Our approach integrates simultaneously job search behaviour and frictional unemployment, contrary to previous literature. This type of model allows us to deal with effects of policies on unemployment rate, employment rate and welfare. Our results suggest that reducing employers contributions has larger effects on unemployment rate and unemployment spell, whereas redducing taxes paid by employees has larger effects on participation rates and welfare. [fre] Nous comparons les conséquences de politiques de réduction des charges patronales sur les bas salaires et de politiques d'incitation au travail, du type prime pour l'emploi, dans un modèle dynamique où le chômage frictionne! et les comportements de recherche d'emploi sont explicitement pris en compte, contrairement aux approches plus traditionnelles expliquant le chômage dans un cadre statique. Notre approche permet d'appréhender les conséquences de ces politiques sur le taux de chômage, le taux d'emploi et le bien-être. Nos résultats suggèrent que les réductions de charges patronales sont plus efficaces pour réduire le taux de chômage et sa durée, tandis que les incitations au travail ont les effets les plus importants sur le bien-être des chômeurs et sur les taux d'activité.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc & Etienne Lehmann, 2002. "Faut-il inciter l'offre ou la demande de travail peu qualifié?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(6), pages 1305-1327.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_6_410470
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maxim Engers & Steven Stern, 2002. "Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 73-114, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Etienne Lehmann, 2003. "Évaluation de la mise en place d’un système d’allocation universelle en présence de qualifications hétérogènes : le rôle institutionnel du salaire minimum," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 157(1), pages 31-50.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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