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Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire


  • Giuseppe Diana


[fre] Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire. . La conduite discrétionnaire de la politique monétaire conduit à un biais inflationniste. Les résultats décevants obtenus par l'approche réputationnelle, initiée par Barro et Gordon [1983], pour résorber ce biais reposent sur un comportement statique et peu réaliste, à nos yeux, des agents du secteur privé. L'introduction d'un mécanisme d'indexation permet de dépasser ce caractère statique et d'endogénéiserles représailles du secteur privé. Dans ce contexte, nous parvenons à mettre en évidence l'existence d'équilibres réputationnels en horizon fini et infini. Nous démontrons qu'en horizon fini le biais inflationniste caractérisant l'équilibre est décroissant avec le pouvoir de rattrapage salarial du secteur privé. Enfin, en horizon infini, nous parvenons à démontrer l'existence d'un équilibre réputationnel caractérisé par un biais inflationniste nul. [eng] Wage indexation, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. . Discretionary monetary policy leads to an inflationary bias. The disappointing results obtained by the reputation building approach, initiatedby Barro and Gordon [1983] to solve this bias, rely on a static and non realistic behaviour of the private sector's agents. By integrating indexation in their behaviour, we demonstrate the existence of a reputational equilibrium in both finite and infinite horizon models. Moreover, we demonstrate that, in a finite horizon model, the equilibrium inflationary bias is decreasing with the indexing parameter. Finally, when the horizon becomes infinite, we obtain a reputational equilibrium with no inflationary bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Diana, 2002. "Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(1), pages 43-61.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_1_410390

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit


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