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Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire


  • Giuseppe Diana


Discretionary monetary policy leads to an inflationary bias. The disappointing results obtained by the reputation building approach, initiated by Barro and Gordon [1983] to solve this bias, rely on a static and non realistic behaviour of the private sector’s agents. By integrating indexation in their behaviour, we demonstrate the existence of a reputational equilibrium in both finite and infinite horizon models. Moreover, we demonstrate that, in a finite horizon model, the equilibrium inflationary bias is decreasing with the indexing parameter. Finally, when the horizon becomes infinite, we obtain a reputational equilibrium with no inflationary bias. Classification JEL : E5

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Diana, 2002. "Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 53(1), pages 43-61.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_531_0043

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    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit


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