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Entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix

Listed author(s):
  • Karine Brisset
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    [fre] Entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix Cet article propose une analyse théorique de la formation d'une entente partielle dans un appel d'offres au premier prix. L'analyse des stratégies d'offres à l'équilibre montre que le représentant de l'entente a toujours intérêt à soumettre une offre moins agressive qu'un offreur externe que ce dernier soit informé ou non de la présence de l'entente. Lorsque les offreurs externes sont supposés ignorer la présence d'une entente partielle, nous montrons que l'appel d'offres au premier prix donne à son initiateur une espérance de revenu supérieure à celle obtenue dans un appel d'offres au second prix en présence de cette entente. [eng] Incomplete collusion in first price sealed bid auction This paper deals with collusive behavior among a subset of bidders in a first price sealed-bid auction. The analysis shows that cartel's bid is always less aggressive than outsiders' bids, when outsiders are aware or not from the presence of a collusion. We prove that the first price auction gives the auctioneer a greater expected revenue than the second price auction in the presence of an incomplete collusion when outsiders are not aware from the collusion.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 29-41

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_1_410389
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