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Transaction, jugement et théorie des jeux. Evaluation et application

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  • Régis Deloche

Abstract

[fre] Juridiquement, toute instance se décompose en trois phases : engagement, mise en état, jugement. Dans la littérature économique, ce triptyque se présente aujourd'hui principalement sous la forme d'un jeu non coopératif dynamique à information incomplète dans lequel les joueurs sont les parties et dont l'issue peut être une transaction ou un jugement. L'objectif de cet article est double : présenter et évaluer cette boîte à outils puis l'utiliser pour comparer, à travers une étude de cas, la règle américaine et la règle française de financement du procès. [eng] The litigation of a dispute follows a definite and well-worn path. If Victim wants to recover damages from Injurer, the lawsuit begins when Victim files a complaint. Injurer is required to file an answer. Next the parties engage in discovery. At any point during the process, the parties may settle the dispute on any terms they find mutually acceptable. The purpose of this paper is twofold: we provide an appraisal of the two-person dynamic games of incomplete information which have been used to model litigation; we compare, through a case-study, the american system (all litigants pay their own court costs) and the trench rule (the losing party is liable for the winner's legal fees, up to a reasonable limit) for allocating court costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Régis Deloche, 2001. "Transaction, jugement et théorie des jeux. Evaluation et application," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(5), pages 975-991.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_5_410367
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.2001.410367
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410367
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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