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Elections et favoritisme dans l'attribution des marchés de services publics locaux


  • Christophe Gence-Creux


[eng] Our study of sixty French municipalities shows that they have a tendency to concentrate the management of local public goods under a unique manager. This seems to go against the egalitarian and transparency principles of the European Union for attribution of markets. We show how "libre administration" and "intuitu personae" principles can lead a mayor, who has electoral concerns, to favor a unique manager even though this choice can in fact be inefficient. We also consider the natural limits to this behavior. [fre] Une enquête réalisée auprès d'une soixantaine de communes françaises montre une tendance, de la part de ces communes, à regrouper la gestion de leurs services publics locaux entre les mains d'un unique opérateur. Cette tendance semble aller à /'encontre des principes d'égalité et de transparence préconisés par l'Union européenne pour l'attribution des marchés. Dans cette analyse, nous montrons comment les principes de libre adminis­tration et de choix intuitu personae peuvent inciter un maire, avec un objectif privé de réélection, à confier la gestion de plusieurs services à un même opérateur, et donc éventuellement à favoriser un opérateur inefficace au moment de l'attribution d'un marché. Nous considérons également les limites naturelles à ce phénomène.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Gence-Creux, 2001. "Elections et favoritisme dans l'attribution des marchés de services publics locaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(3), pages 753-763.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_3_410354 Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410354

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. R. Bruce Billings, 1982. "Specification of Block Rate Price Variables in Demand Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(3), pages 386-394.
    2. J. E. Schefter & E. L. David, 1985. "Estimating Residential Water Demand under Multi-Part Tariffs Using Aggregate Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(3), pages 272-280.
    3. Lars Gårn Hansen, 1996. "Water and Energy Price Impacts on Residential Water Demand in Copenhagen," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(1), pages 66-79.
    4. Michael L. Nieswiadomy & David J. Molina, 1989. "Comparing Residential Water Demand Estimates under Decreasing and Increasing Block Rates Using Household Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(3), pages 280-289.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Guirou, 2016. "La carte cognitive négociée : un outil susceptible de rétablir la confiance dans les collectivités territoriales ?," Post-Print halshs-01449361, HAL.
    2. Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane, 2013. "Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 167-186.

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