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Contrainte de capacité et développement des marques de distributeurs


  • Laurent Flochel
  • Marie-Laure Allain


[fre] Cet article tente d'expliquer l'impact ambigu de la loi Raffarin sur les relations entre producteurs et distributeurs, en montrant qu'elle exerce deux effets opposés sur le partage du profit entre les secteurs amont et aval. Nous proposons un modèle permettant d'appréhender l'influence d'une contrainte de capacité sur les choix de référencement d'un distributeur, et notamment sur sa décision d'introduire ou non une marque propre menaçant la situation de monopole du producteur. Nous montrons que, seule, l'imposition d'une limitation de la taille des magasins peut renforcer le pouvoir des producteurs face aux distributeurs, mais qu'associée à une barrière à l'entrée en aval, elle ne permet plus d'améliorer le pouvoir de négociation des producteurs. [eng] Capacity constraint and the development of own brands. . In this paper, we try to explain the ambiguous impact of the Raffarin law on the relationships between manufacturers and retailers. We show that the law has two conflicting effects on the share of profit between upstream and downstream firms. We study the influence of a capacity constraint on the development of own brands by retailers. We show that, when entry is free at the retailers' level, a restriction of the retailers' capacity, as imposed by the Raffarin law, can improve producers' profit. But barriers to entry on the downstream market remove this effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Flochel & Marie-Laure Allain, 2001. "Contrainte de capacité et développement des marques de distributeurs," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(3), pages 643-653.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_3_410344
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410344

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. R. Bruce Billings, 1982. "Specification of Block Rate Price Variables in Demand Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(3), pages 386-394.
    2. Lars Gårn Hansen, 1996. "Water and Energy Price Impacts on Residential Water Demand in Copenhagen," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(1), pages 66-79.
    3. Michael L. Nieswiadomy & David J. Molina, 1989. "Comparing Residential Water Demand Estimates under Decreasing and Increasing Block Rates Using Household Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(3), pages 280-289.
    4. J. E. Schefter & E. L. David, 1985. "Estimating Residential Water Demand under Multi-Part Tariffs Using Aggregate Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(3), pages 272-280.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anne Perrot, 2002. "Les frontières entre régulation sectorielle et politique de la concurrence," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 81-112.
    2. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle, 2002. "Les relations entre producteurs et distributeurs : bilan et limites de trente ans de régulation," Working Papers hal-00243000, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts


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