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Fiscalité imparfaite et privatisation de masse. L'économie politique des coalitions changeantes


  • Carlos Winograd
  • Rudiger Ahrend


[fre] Depuis quelques années, la lutte contre la fraude fiscale et le transfert de la propriété des mains de l'État vers le secteur privé sont deux dossiers prioritaires de nombreux gouvernements. Dans le travail qui suit, nous étudions le lien entre ces deux problèmes, qui peuvent, à première vue, paraître indépendants. Nous déterminons comment le processus politique va déterminer l'efficacité du système fiscal d'un pays. Ensuite, nous étudions en quoi l'efficacité de la fiscalité peut avoir un impact sur des tentatives de privatisation. Nous cherchons à savoir sous quelles conditions la privatisation aura lieu, et qui seront les supporters et les principaux gagnants de ce processus. Par ailleurs, nous examinons l'impact de diverses formes de corruption sur sa viabilité politique des privatisations. [eng] Imperfect taxation and mass privatisation: the political economy of changing coalitions. . In recent years fighting tax evasion and transferring ownership from the state to the private sector have been high on the priority list of many governments. In this work we investigate the connection between this apparently uncorrelated issues. We determine how the political process will determine the efficiency of a country's tax system. We then regard how the efficiency of taxation impacts on the outcome of privatisation attempts. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption on the public support for privatisation.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Winograd & Rudiger Ahrend, 2001. "Fiscalité imparfaite et privatisation de masse. L'économie politique des coalitions changeantes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(3), pages 517-529.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_3_410333
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410333

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. R. Bruce Billings, 1982. "Specification of Block Rate Price Variables in Demand Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(3), pages 386-394.
    2. Lars Gårn Hansen, 1996. "Water and Energy Price Impacts on Residential Water Demand in Copenhagen," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(1), pages 66-79.
    3. Michael L. Nieswiadomy & David J. Molina, 1989. "Comparing Residential Water Demand Estimates under Decreasing and Increasing Block Rates Using Household Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(3), pages 280-289.
    4. J. E. Schefter & E. L. David, 1985. "Estimating Residential Water Demand under Multi-Part Tariffs Using Aggregate Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(3), pages 272-280.
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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance


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