Fiscalité imparfaite et privatisation de masse. L'économie politique des coalitions changeantes
In recent years fighting tax evasion and transferring ownership from the state to the private sector have been high on the priority list of many governments. In this work we investigate the connection between this apparently uncorrelated issues. We determine how the political process will determine the efficiency of a country’s tax system. We then regard how the efficiency of taxation impacts on the outcome of privatisation attempts. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption on the public support for privatisation. Classification JEL : D31, E62, H26
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