IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Fidélité à la marque, fidélité à l'enseigne: une analyse des déterminants des rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs

  • Stéphane Caprice

[eng] Within-brand and within-store competition: a determinant analysis of the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers - The growing importance of mass distribution has transformed the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. Regarding the limited effectiveness of numerous laws (Royer, Raffarin, Galland), which were supposed to restrain the increasing power of retailers, an accurate analysis of the relationships between manufacturers and retailers is required. This paper proposes a model where we study the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers by underlining the possibility of switching stores within brand or switching brands within store. The model is a double duopoly where producers and retailers are differentiated at each level. To represent vertical contracting between producers and retailers, we assume that contracts are in two-part tariffs and secretly and bilaterally negotiated. A profit analysis shows that producers' and retailers' differentiation have different consequences. Retailers can take advantage of a higher within-brand competition but a higher within- store competition, always, is detrimental to producers. [fre] Depuis de nombreuses années, on assiste à une évolution des rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs en faveur de l'aval. L'effet limité des différentes réglementations (Royer, Raffarin, Galland) censées contenir le pouvoir croissant des distributeurs incite à une analyse plus fine des relations « producteurs-distributeurs », en particulier des déterminants des pouvoirs économiques des uns et des autres. L'article propose un modèle permettant de mesurer la répartition des rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs en mettant l'accent sur le comportement des consommateurs et les éventuels reports de consommation (intra marque et inter marques) lorsqu'un produit vient à manquer chez un distributeur. Le modèle considéré est un double duopole amont et aval, dans lequel les producteurs et les distributeurs sont, à chaque niveau, imparfaitement substituables. Les contrats sont en deux parties, secrets et négociés bilatéralement. L'analyse de la distribution des profits fait apparaître un rôle asymétrique des degrés de différenciation amont et aval. En particulier, une différenciation faible entre producteurs (faible fidélité à la marque) peut être favorable aux distributeurs, mais une différenciation faible entre distributeurs (faible fidélité à l'enseigne) est nécessairement défavorable aux producteurs.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ecoru.2004.5507
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/ecoru_0013-0559_2004_num_283_1_5507/ecoru_0013-0559_2004_num_283_1_5507.pdf?mode=light
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie rurale.

Volume (Year): 283 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 72-84

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2004_num_283_1_5507
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2004.5507
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecoru

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2004_num_283_1_5507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.