Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory
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- Raul V. Fabella, 2016. "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201606, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Yannis Karagiannis, 2007. "Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies," RSCAS Working Papers 2007/16, European University Institute.
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016.
"Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
- Muller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yannis Karagiannis, 2007. "Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations," RSCAS Working Papers 2007/04, European University Institute.
More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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