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What are the Causes of Disturbances of Morality in Redistribution Systems

Listed author(s):
  • Radim valencik


    (University of Finance and Administration)

  • Petr Budinsky


    (University of Finance and Administration)

Registered author(s):

    A redistribution system has two main attributes: 1. The greater the deviation of the payout of players from their performance, the greater the decline in the performance of the system. 2. The cause of this deviation is the formation of coalitions that treat their members preferentially and discriminate other players. If the players in these systems focus on the formation of discriminating coalitions, the system converges towards oscillating between discriminatory balances. But there is a strategy that leads to the attainment of a mutually acceptable balance, in which each of the players improves his / her position in comparison to the average payout that he/she would get when using a strategy based on the formation of discriminating coalitions. In systems of the given type this can be considered as the objective foundation of rationally justified morality. The stated finding is important and opens the way to revealing what in reality most prevents the attainment of a balance that is acceptable for everyone. It turns out that this factor is parallel redistribution games. The revelation of their role as well as their classification and description of some of them is of significant importance to managerial practice.

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    Article provided by University of Finance and Administration in its journal ACTA VSFS.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 140-162

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    Handle: RePEc:prf:journl:v:4:y:2010:i:1:p:140-162
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