IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0291459.html

Cooperative protection of technical secrets in cultural industry cluster-based on evolutionary game model of leading enterprises and following enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Mingxia Xu
  • Zuojiao Hu

Abstract

Due to the confidentiality, value and exclusivity of technical secrets, how to protect the technical secrets within cultural industry clusters has become a paradoxical issue and a research hotspot. Focusing on the collaborative protection of technical secrets within cultural industry clusters, this paper analyzes the strategies of collaborative protection of technical secrets between leading enterprises and following enterprises based on evolutionary game theory, and uses dynamic evolution and simulation methods to identify key factors behind the strategy choices, which further enriches the evolutionary mechanism of collaborative protection, and expands the application scenarios of the theory of evolutionary game. As the research results show, the collaborative protection strategy of technical secrets within cultural industry clusters is feasible, the cost of collaborative protection, government subsidies, and compensation for collaborative deposits are key variables that determine the trend of the game. The government subsidy coefficient, the collaborative deposits, and the difference in the number of technology secrets are strongly sensitive factors underlying the mode of protection, while the synergistic benefits between firms are weakly sensitive factors. Therefore, this paper proposes that increasing government subsidies and collaborative deposits, and reducing the differences in the number of technical secrets among game subjects can promote enterprises to eliminate suspicion and increase their willingness to cooperate in protecting technical secrets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mingxia Xu & Zuojiao Hu, 2023. "Cooperative protection of technical secrets in cultural industry cluster-based on evolutionary game model of leading enterprises and following enterprises," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(9), pages 1-22, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0291459
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0291459
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0291459
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0291459&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0291459?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    2. Lu, Jinna & Wang, Lu & Wang, Yi-Ling & Zhang, Xiaoguang, 2017. "Logit selection promotes cooperation in voluntary public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 310(C), pages 134-138.
    3. Yang, Shi-Han & Song, Qi-Qing, 2018. "Group learning versus local learning: Which is prefer for public cooperation?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 1251-1258.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Qianru Chen & Hualin Xie & Qunli Zhai, 2022. "Management Policy of Farmers’ Cultivated Land Abandonment Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-23, February.
    2. Lichi Zhang & Yanyan Jiang & Junmin Wu, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Residents’ Participation in Waste Separation Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(21), pages 1-16, November.
    3. Gu, Tianqi & Xu, Weiping & Liang, Hua & He, Qing & Zheng, Nan, 2024. "School bus transport service strategies’ policy-making mechanism – An evolutionary game approach," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    4. Wang Mingbao & Du Zhiping & Duan Hong, 2017. "Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 5(5), pages 411-434, October.
    5. Sun, Yong & Liu, Baoyin & Sun, Zhongrui & Yang, Ruijia, 2023. "Inter-regional cooperation in the transfers of energy-intensive industry: An evolutionary game approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    6. Jialu Li & Meiying Yang & Wei Xing & Xuan Zhao, 2018. "Information Acquisition Behavior: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 434-455, June.
    7. Hongxia Sun & Yao Wan & Huirong Lv, 2020. "System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-21, February.
    8. Song Yang & Jincai Zhuang & Aifeng Wang & Yancai Zhang, 2019. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-13, November.
    9. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-155, May.
    10. Yinglin Wang & Leqi Chen & Jiaxin Zhuang, 2024. "Research on ESG Investment Efficiency Regulation from the Perspective of Reciprocity and Evolutionary Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 64(3), pages 1665-1695, September.
    11. Mengyang Cui & Yuhong Wang, 2025. "Research on New Energy Vehicle Power Battery Recycling Deposit System Based on Evolutionary Game Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(9), pages 1-22, April.
    12. Ning, Jiajun & Xiong, Lixin & Shao, Changhua, 2025. "Dynamic evolution analysis of enterprises digital technology innovation strategies in energy supply chain collaboration: A bargaining theory perspective," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    13. Guohui Song & Yongbin Wang, 2021. "Mainstream Value Information Push Strategy on Chinese Aggregation News Platform: Evolution, Modelling and Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(19), pages 1-17, October.
    14. Zhaoyang Cai & Ge Song & Ruiqing Su & Yue Wang, 2025. "New insights to sustainable utilization of cultivated land: a synergistic path for coordinating competition of cultivated land utilization for crops based on multiple stakeholders," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 27(11), pages 28309-28332, November.
    15. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    16. Jin, Tao & Jiang, Yulian & Liu, Xingwen, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 440(C).
    17. Han, Minglong & Liu, Yupeng, 2026. "Dynamic pricing mechanisms for generative artificial intelligence models across heterogeneous scenarios: An evolutionary game and complex network approach," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 516(C).
    18. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.
    19. Jinxiu Pi & Hui Yang & Yadong Shu & Chongyi Zhong & Guanghui Yang, 2020. "The Stability of Two-Community Replicator Dynamics with Discrete Multi-Delays," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-17, November.
    20. Guanqiao Pan & Hongchao Jiang & Qianhui Jin & Tianyi Zhao & Jiajun Wang & Li Wang, 2021. "Study on the Sharing Transportation Based on Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-28, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0291459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.