The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting
If each voter is a price taker who consumes a bundle of goods such that his marginal rate of substitution equals the relative prices of goods in different periods, all consumers will have the same marginal rate of time preference. This seems to suggest that voters will unanimously agree on the social discount rate. Such reasoning ignores, however, the effects of different investment policies on the relative prices of goods in different periods. A consideration of this effect shows that a majority of voters may prefer a social discount rate that allows the adoption of inefficient investments.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 44 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|