Merit Goods and Public Choice: The Case of Higher Education
This paper examines the supply and demand behavior of taxpayers as "suppliers" and students as "beneficiaries" of the higher-education process. The authors treat higher education as a merit good, and present an argument in favor of an assumption of nonreciprocal interdependence between the taxpayers and the beneficiaries. They conclude that there is no evidence to support the proposition that subsidies-in-kind, in the form of attendance at and only at a state institution, have had a retardative effect on the aggregate product ion/consumption of higher education.
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Volume (Year): 41 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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