Use of Central Bank Credit Auctions in Economies in Transition
A number of economies in transition have instituted central bank credit auctions as part of a package of reforms seeking to improve monetary control and foster money market development. This paper examines the use of those auctions and features of their design, including collateralization and access rules intended to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard. The implementation of credit auctions in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union is surveyed. The experiences of countries in Eastern Europe suggest that credit auctions can be a useful tool in the transition toward indirect monetary control and the development of interbank markets.
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Volume (Year): 42 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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