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Why the European Commission Fails to Adhere to the Principles of Good Donorship: The Case of the Governance Incentive Tranche

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  • Nadia Molenaers

    (Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium)

  • Leen Nijs

    (Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium)

Abstract

The European Commission (EC) launched a new aid instrument: the ‘governance incentive tranche’, to incentivise African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP)-governments to carry out governance reforms. This new initiative fails to incorporate the principles spurred by the aid effectiveness debate, to which the EC has committed itself. This article sets out to understand the gap between discourse and practice and argues that in order to fully grasp the complexity of donor behaviour, domestic issues and political arrangements have to be brought into the analysis. The incentive tranche illustrates how the complexity of the European construction makes the formulation of a coherent policy exceptionally difficult.La Commission Européenne a introduit un nouvel instrument d’aide, ‘la Tranche Incitative pour la bonne Gouvernance’, afin d’inciter les gouvernements des pays in French ACP à mettre en œuvre des réformes de gouvernance. Cette nouvelle initiative n’intègre pas les principes émanant du débat sur l’efficacité de l’aide, principes que la Commission s’est engagée à respecter. Cet article cherche à comprendre ce décalage entre le discours et la pratique et soutient que pour appréhender pleinement la complexité des comportements des pays donateurs, il faut prendre en compte dans l’analyse les questions locales et les accords politiques. La tranche incitative illustre bien à quel point la complexité de la construction Européenne rend difficile l’élaboration d’une politique cohérente.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadia Molenaers & Leen Nijs, 2011. "Why the European Commission Fails to Adhere to the Principles of Good Donorship: The Case of the Governance Incentive Tranche," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 23(3), pages 409-425, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:eurjdr:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:409-425
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:pal:eurjdr:v:29:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1057_ejdr.2016.16 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    3. Koch, Svea, 2015. "A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 97-108.
    4. repec:bla:devpol:v:35:y:2017:i:4:p:493-511 is not listed on IDEAS

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