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Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes and the Lake Carriers Association

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher S Decker

    (Department of Economics, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 60th and Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182, USA)

  • William Corcoran

    (Department of Economics, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 60th and Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182, USA)

  • David T Flynn

    (Department of Economics, University of North Dakota, Gamble 290 Centennial Drive, Grand Forks, ND 58202, USA)

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between accident-related shipping losses on the Great Lakes between 1900 and 1939 and the role the Lake Carriers Association (LCA) played in limiting or preventing such losses. Moreover, we address the relative benefits of private sector effort, through the LCA, and public sector efforts to reduce shipwrecks and capital losses through National Weather Bureau stations. Overall, our results confirm existing research that National Weather Bureau stations reduce accident-related shipping losses. However, we also find that increased membership in the LCA also reduced such losses, and to a significant degree.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher S Decker & William Corcoran & David T Flynn, 2011. "Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes and the Lake Carriers Association," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 450-469.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:450-469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • N82 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
    • N62 - Economic History - - Manufacturing and Construction - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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