Bio-surveillance as One Health: A Critique of Recent Definitions and Policy Initiatives

Recent policy initiatives on One Health Approach focus almost exclusively on surveillance, information sharing and zoonotic risk prediction, rather than reflect the notion of Oneness and the international solidarity approach that should go with it. The One Health narrative is increasingly acquiring the contours of a powerful technological biosurveillance agenda, quite distant from the much-needed holistic approach towards health, far removed from an authentic health promotion or disease prevention agenda. While the One Health Approach can utilize international legal principles such as common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) or access and benefit sharing (ABS) to promote access to resources for pandemic prevention and response in developing countries, including for climate action, social protection, and universal healthcare, such international legal principles or regimes are barely to be seen invoked and implemented in international arrangements. Through the lenses of the pandemic, the article examines the role of the One Health Joint Plan of Action by the Quadripartite (the four UN agencies involved, i.e.: WHO, FAO, WOAH, UNEP), the definition of One Health provided by the One Health High Level Expert Panel and other contributions, as well as the role of the World Bank Operational Frameworks and Projects in unfolding this skewed understanding of One Health that promotes surveillance on priority basis. Finally, the article examines the ongoing negotiations at the World Health Organization for a legally binding instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response and how these seek to legitimize this distorted understanding.