Survey Article: Optimal Tautness and the Economics of Incentives in Bureaucracies
This paper reviews the economic literature which deals with the tautness of plans and with its relevance to macroeconomic pressures in Soviet-type economies. It opens with a discussion of Kornai 's shortage economy, a systemic approach to pressure, which is an alternative to the plan-related tautness coined by Hunter, and deals tautness from the agency angle, both in a static framework and in a dynamic, ratchet-related, framework.
Volume (Year): 35 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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