IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market Concentration and Economic Theory


  • Dobre I. Claudia

    () (“Ovidius” University of Constanta, Faculty of Economic Sciences)


The economics of market concentration and antitrust law have a long-lasting tradition of fruitful interaction. In static neoclassical theory, market concentration - irrespective of the reasons of it – was considered harmful. Later, adherents of the Harvard School correctly observed a relationship between industry concentration and profits, but erroneously inferred that those profits were the result of artificial market power. In contrast, researchers working in the tradition of the Chicago school maintain that high profitability in a concentrated industry has to be interpreted as a reflection of superior efficiency of larger firms over smaller ones, not as a reflection of market power. Post-Chicago economists developed new game theoretic models and stated that the efficiency explanations of the Chicago School were insufficient and inadequate explanations of firm conduct or market structure. More recent, proponents of innovation school believe that there can be many instances where the losses in allocation inefficiency will be small and dwarfed by the gains in productivity and innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Dobre I. Claudia, 2011. "Market Concentration and Economic Theory," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 350-355, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ovi:oviste:v:xi:y:2011:i:9:p:350-355

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    market concentration; schools of though: Harvard; Chicago; Post-Chicago and Innovation;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ovi:oviste:v:xi:y:2011:i:9:p:350-355. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gheorghiu Gabriela). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.