Coping with Crises: Policies to Protect Employment and Earnings
The continuing failure of many countries to adequately mitigate the adverse labor market impacts of economic downturns is of concern, since labor market volatility can exacerbate poverty and stunt growth. This article aims to identify potentially effective policies responses to crises by navigating the potential tradeoffs between offsetting adverse short-term impacts of economic downturns on the quantity and quality of jobs, and preserving incentives for economic recovery. The authors propose a taxonomy that categorizes interventions depending on whether they mitigate the negative short-term impact of crises or whether they stimulate recovery. The taxonomy helps policymakers to identify “win–win” policies that avoid potential tradeoffs between these objectives by simultaneously serving both. Common elements of effective interventions are feasibility, flexibility (for example the capacity for scaling up and down), and incentive compatibility—and there is no substitute for being prepared. Having sound safety nets in place before a crisis is superior to haphazardly implementing responses after a crisis hits. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 27 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: https://academic.oup.com/wbro
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|