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Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets

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  • Marcello Bofondi
  • Giorgio Gobbi

Abstract

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks' lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants' loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks' loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcello Bofondi & Giorgio Gobbi, 2006. "Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 10(1), pages 39-67.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:39-67
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10679-006-6978-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Caterina Giannetti & Nicola Jentzsch & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2010. "Information Sharing and Cross-border Entry in European Banking," CEIS Research Paper 178, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Dec 2010.
    2. Rachele Anna Ambrosio & Paolo Coccorese, 2015. "Bad Loans and De Novo Banks: Evidence From Italy," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44(1), pages 101-122, February.
    3. Crawford, Gregory S. & Pavanini, Nicola & Schivardi, Fabiano, 2015. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 227, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Florian Heider & Roman Inderst, 2012. "Loan Prospecting," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(8), pages 2381-2415.
    5. Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2013. "Credit within the Firm," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 211-247.
    6. Giorgio Albareto & Roberto Felici & Enrico Sette, 2016. "Does credit scoring improve the selection of borrowers and credit quality?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1090, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Manuel Illueca & José Pastor & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2009. "The effects of geographic expansion on the productivity of Spanish savings banks," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 119-143, October.
    8. Alexandra D'Onofrio & Pierluigi Murro, 2013. "Local banking development and income distribution across Italian provinces," Working Papers CASMEF 1307, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    9. Sinha, Pankaj & Sharma, Sakshi, 2016. "Relationship of financial stability and risk with market structure and competition: evidence from Indian banking sector," MPRA Paper 72247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Sauro Mocetti, 2012. "Educational choices and the selection process: before and after compulsory schooling," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 189-209, February.
    11. Commendatore, Pasquale & Michetti, Elisabetta & Purificato, Francesco, 2013. "Financial Development and Agglomeration," MPRA Paper 48425, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Di Cesare, Antonio, 2009. "Securitization and Bank Stability," MPRA Paper 16831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Raoul Minetti & Pierluigi Murro & Zeno Rotondi & Susan Chun Zhu, 2016. "Financial Constraints, Firms' Supply Chains and Internationalization," CERBE Working Papers wpC06, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
    14. Tadanori Yosano & Takayoshi Nakaoka, 2011. "The Roles of Relationship Lending and Utilization of Soft Information on Bank Performance in Competitive Local Markets," Discussion Papers 2011-41, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    15. Kalyvas, Antonios Nikolaos & Mamatzakis, Emmanuel, 2014. "Does business regulation matter for banks in the European Union?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 278-324.
    16. Ghosh, Saibal, 2008. "Financial Inclusion and Financial Fragility: An Empirical Note," MPRA Paper 24252, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Wang, Teng, 2015. "Bank Entry Mode, Labor Market Flexibility and Economic Activity," HIT-REFINED Working Paper Series 25, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    18. Paolo Coccorese & Giovanni Ferri, 2017. "Is Competition Among Cooperative Banks a Negative Sum Game?," CERBE Working Papers wpC19, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
    19. Crawfordy, Gregory S & Pavaniniz, Nicola & Schivardi, Fabiano, 2013. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in the Loan Market," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 167, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    20. De Bonis, Riccardo & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco & Stacchini, Massimiliano, 2012. "The Italian banking system: Facts and interpretations," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp12068, University of Molise, Dept. EGSeI.
    21. Coccorese, Paolo, 2012. "Banks as ‘fat cats’: Branching and price decisions in a two-stage model of competition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 64(5), pages 338-363.
    22. Lorenzo Ciari & Riccardo De Bonis, 2011. "Entry decisions after deregulation: the role of incumbents' market power," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 50, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    23. Nabi, Mahmoud Sami & Ben Souissi, Souraya, 2011. "Could dishonest banks be disciplined ?," MPRA Paper 32010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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