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Effects of Constitutional and Political Controls on State Expenditures

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  • James W. Endersby
  • Michael J. Towle

Abstract

State governments have employed various statutory and constitutional devices to limit government spending. Many of these devices are intended to increase executive control over expenditures. The research design employed here suggests that such efforts are ineffective or counterproductive. However, this research indicates that state legislatures controlled by a single party are more likely than divided legislatures to limit government spending and minimize debt. Thus, political and electoral influences appear to explain state expenditures belter than legal restrictions on the appropriations process. This study adds to the literature by simultaneously analyzing multiple restraints on state government spending and debt. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Endersby & Michael J. Towle, 0. "Effects of Constitutional and Political Controls on State Expenditures," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 27(1), pages 83-98.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:27:y::i:1:p:83-98
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Rita Loureiro, 2001. "Controlling the Public debt in Presidential Systems: Constitutional And Legal Restrictions in the US and Brazil," Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 29th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 006, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    2. McCloud, Nadine & Delgado, Michael S. & Holmes, Chanit'a, 2018. "Does a stronger system of law and order constrain the effects of foreign direct investment on government size?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 258-283.
    3. Brian Baugus & Feler Bose & Jeffry Jacob, 2021. "Get in line: Do part‐time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 185-199, January.
    4. John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.
    5. Saeid Mahdavi, 2010. "Fiscal Stringency and Fiscal Sustainability in the American States: Panel Evidence," Working Papers 0016, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.

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