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Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance
[Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games of incomplete information]

Author

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  • Christian W Bach
  • Andrés Perea

Abstract

The solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian W Bach & Andrés Perea, 2021. "Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance [Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games of incomplete information]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 820-836.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:73:y:2021:i:2:p:820-836.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpz075
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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