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When terrorism is evidence of state success: securing the state against territorial groups

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  • David B. Carter

Abstract

I develop a game-theoretic model in which the state first allocates limited resources across defensive and offensive security measures, simultaneously choosing whether to attempt forceful elimination of the group. The group subsequently chooses whether to use terrorism or attempt to take territory via guerrilla tactics. The results suggest that states most capable of fighting groups with territorial objectives experience the highest levels of terrorism. Under weak conditions, states always allocate their resources to deter groups from carrying out guerrilla attacks. Accordingly, when it is possible for both guerrilla and terrorist attacks to be optimal for a group, states allocate resources to ensure a terrorist campaign, even though this (mis)allocation facilitates more costly terrorist attacks than happen when facing a group that only uses terrorism.

Suggested Citation

  • David B. Carter, 2015. "When terrorism is evidence of state success: securing the state against territorial groups," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 116-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:67:y:2015:i:1:p:116-132.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpu041
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    Cited by:

    1. Austin L. Wright, 2016. "Economic Shocks and Rebel," HiCN Working Papers 232, Households in Conflict Network.
    2. Thomas Gries & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'," Working Papers CIE 95, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    3. Sonin, Konstantin & Wright, Austin L., 2018. "Rebel Capacity and Combat Tactics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Therese Anders, 2020. "Territorial control in civil wars: Theory and measurement using machine learning," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(6), pages 701-714, November.
    5. Christophe Muller & Pierre Pecher, 2021. "Terrorism, Insurgency, State Repression, and Cycles of Violence," Working Papers halshs-03134347, HAL.
    6. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2023. "Common myths of terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 271-301, April.
    7. Gries, Thomas & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' '- Compromise for Peace versus Conventional, Guerilla, or Terrorist Warfare," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145617, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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