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Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew F. Daughety
  • Jennifer F. Reinganum

Abstract

We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when non-strategic outside observers rationally use the case disposition (plea bargain, dropped case, acquittal, or conviction) to impose informal sanctions on both parties. Outside observers recognize that error in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means they may misclassify defendants and thereby impose sanctions erroneously. We show that: (1) changes in the level of the formal sanction affect the level of informal sanctions imposed and (2) increases in the informal sanction rates imposed on prosecutors result in changes in the level of informal sanctions imposed on defendants. We also extend the model to allow for a three-outcome verdict (not guilty, not proven, and guilty), sometimes referred to as the "Scottish" verdict. We find that the Scottish verdict is justice-improving in that it benefits innocent defendants, outside observers, and prosecutors in comparison with the standard (two-outcome) verdict. (JEL K4, D8)

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2016. "Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 359-394.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:2:p:359-394.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewv020
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2016. "Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 113-133, March.
    2. David Bjerk, 2021. "Socially Optimal Plea Bargaining With Costly Trials And Bayesian Juries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 263-279, January.
    3. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    4. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2020. "Psychological game theory in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 159-180, January.
    5. Morawska Sylwia & Prusak Błażej & Banasik Przemysław & Woźniak-Jęchorek Beata, 2019. "Sanctions and their role in preventing the appropriation of the creditor’s property rights in bankruptcy proceedings–the case of Poland," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 93-113, March.
    6. Shaun Larcom & Mare Sarr, 2018. "On the Perils of Commitment to Punishment when Criminals Are Strategic," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 391-418.
    7. Berg, Nathan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Plea bargaining with multiple defendants and its deterrence effect," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 58-70.
    8. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, 2016. "Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convictions through Exoneree Compensation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 173-189.
    9. Bryan C. McCannon, 2021. "Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(2), pages 568-586, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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