A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review
This paper adds to the existing literature on en banc rehearings in two ways. First, I incorporate theoretical results from the literature on Supreme Court certiorari decisions and argue that the ideological direction of panel decisions should influence the probability of en banc rehearing only in conjunction with the panel's ideological predisposition. Second, I build upon existing theories of en banc review by incorporating the multiple levels of the judicial hierarchy into the context in which the circuit decides to hear a case en banc. From these insights, I develop and test three hypotheses about the determinants of en banc review. Specifically, I contend that the ideological relationship between a three-judge panel, the full circuit, and the Supreme Court should all interact with the ideological orientation of the panel's decision when the circuit decides whether or not to review the panel en banc. Original data including all en banc rehearings between 1986 and 1996 are then used to test the theoretical predictions. The empirical analysis provides considerable support for the hypotheses. The findings represent two important advances in the study of the judicial hierarchy: They highlight the strategic interaction between ideological disposition and panel composition in the en banc review process and demonstrate the incentives created by the multiple levels of the federal judiciary. More broadly, the theory and findings developed here have implications for strategic auditing in a political hierarchy. (JEL K40, D72) The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 25 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:55-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.