Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises
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- Shirley, Mary M. & L. Colin Xu, 1997. "Information, incentives, and commitment : an empirical analysis of contracts between government and state enterprises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1769, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
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