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Form- Versus Effects-Based Approaches To The Abuse Of A Dominant Position: The Case Of Ticketmaster Ireland

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  • Paul K. Gorecki

Abstract

The paper applies a form-based and an effects-based approach to determine whether allegations that TicketMaster Ireland's exclusive contracts with the two leading promoters on the island of Ireland resulted in high or excessive prices for the ticketing services provided by TicketMaster Ireland to consumers. The form-based approach strongly supported the allegations of high prices based on exclusive contracts, while the effects-based analysis found, correctly, that countervailing buyer power, efficiencies and other factors meant that TicketMaster Ireland was neither dominant nor that its conduct was anticompetitive. The paper concludes with some suggestions as to the more general implications for the burden of proof in such exclusive contract cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul K. Gorecki, 2006. "Form- Versus Effects-Based Approaches To The Abuse Of A Dominant Position: The Case Of Ticketmaster Ireland," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(3), pages 533-548.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:2:y:2006:i:3:p:533-548.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhl014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Denis Waelbroeck, 2005. "Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 149-171.
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    Cited by:

    1. Muriel Fadairo & Jianyu Yu, 2014. "Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing ; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks," Working Papers 1405, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

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