On Corporate Cartels as Common Pool Resources

Governing the complex institution of a corporate cartel is inherently challenging: colluding firms must jointly manage prices and quantities, avoid detection by authorities, and ensure internal discipline against cheating—all without access to legal enforcement. This paper proposes a novel interpretation of cartel excess profits as a common pool resource (CPR), contrasting with the dominant prisoner’s dilemma framework. Following a three-step approach, the paper first establishes how cartel profits meet the criteria of a CPR. Based on that definition, it applies Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework to analyze the internal governance of cartels. Third, it derives policy recommendations that equip competition authorities with new tools to detect and understand collusion. By reframing cartels as self-governed CPR systems, the paper offers fresh insights at the intersection of managerial governance, antitrust law, and industrial organization. This opens new avenues for both theoretical and applied research.