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Access Pricing for App Stores Under the DMA

Author

Listed:
  • Jacques Crémer
  • David Dinielli
  • Paul Heidhues
  • Gene Kimmelman
  • Giorgio Monti
  • Margaret O’Grady
  • Rupprecht Podszun
  • Monika Schnitzer
  • Fiona Scott Morton
  • Alexandre de Streel

Abstract

This article addresses the fees that Apple and Google might charge business users in their respective mobile ecosystems that would be compliant under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) with a focus on third-party app store access fees. The paper analyses the economic principles behind the DMA’s goals of contestability and fairness, particularly in relation to Apple's App Store. It argues that while Apple may charge a fixed fee to review third-party app stores or apps (‘Review Fee’), the Access Fee for third-party app stores on iOS should be zero to comply with the DMA. This is because non-zero Access Fees hinder competition from alternative app stores. The paper also explains the strategic impact of fees on app developers when they are conditioned on using rival distribution channels; these can block entry and harm market fairness. We recommend a fee structure for Apple’s App Store that includes a zero Access Fee and a reasonable Review Fee. Other aspects of Apple’s ecosystem would continue to be monetizable. The article concludes that opening the app store market under these guidelines would promote innovation and competition, consistent with the DMA’s objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Crémer & David Dinielli & Paul Heidhues & Gene Kimmelman & Giorgio Monti & Margaret O’Grady & Rupprecht Podszun & Monika Schnitzer & Fiona Scott Morton & Alexandre de Streel, 2025. "Access Pricing for App Stores Under the DMA," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 565-594.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:21:y:2025:i:4:p:565-594.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhaf015
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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