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Modularity, identity, and the constitutional diagonal

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  • Richard N Langlois

Abstract

The framework of modular systems articulated in Design Rules can be applied in the larger setting of social institutions. The principles of encapsulation and information hiding operate in society as mechanisms to internalize externalities. This essay focuses on intangible externalities, or “moralisms,” that involve the transmission across module boundaries of pure information rather than materials or energy. Such intangible externalities arise in the practice of identity, the affiliations through which individuals create and define their sense of self. Both formally and informally, individuals tend to modularize themselves into identity groups in order to minimize the costs of the intangible externalities that identities impose on one another. One important way to reduce conflict among identity groups is to create a governance structure in which some interactions are proscribed—the constitutional diagonal. In the end, because of the inherent incompatibilities—the non-modular interactions—between identities that arise inevitably from the very meaning and function of identity, genuine toleration is possible only through the increased standardization of identities. The essay applies these ideas to the problems facing large social networks like Facebook.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard N Langlois, 2023. "Modularity, identity, and the constitutional diagonal," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 32(1), pages 262-276.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:32:y:2023:i:1:p:262-276.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/icc/dtac032
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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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