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Do informational nudges effectively enhance the legal compliance of fertiliser companies? Lessons from randomised field experiments in Japan

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  • Hiroki Sasaki
  • Daisuke Kunii

Abstract

This study examines whether informational nudges effectively enhance adherence to the Fertiliser Act among Japanese fertiliser companies (N = 2,382) by conducting field experiments in collaboration with a national regulatory body. We find that the timely submission of reports to the authority increased by at least 5.7 percentage points, from a baseline of 70.3 per cent. This result suggests that highlighting the consequences of noncompliance—such as imprisonment and fines—through a loss aversion message effectively encourages compliance. These effects sustained for over a year in some regions, though being marginally significant. The loss aversion message has the greatest impact among both the smallest and largest companies.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroki Sasaki & Daisuke Kunii, 2025. "Do informational nudges effectively enhance the legal compliance of fertiliser companies? Lessons from randomised field experiments in Japan," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 52(1), pages 155-186.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:52:y:2025:i:1:p:155-186.
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